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1 Introduction
The literature on tax competition has emphasized that taxation of a mobile
factor may, under certain circumstances, lead to a situation where taxing
decisions have an impact not only on the own budget but on that of other
jurisdictions as well (cf. Wilson, 1999, for an overview). It has been shown
that these scal externalities are the essential distortion behind an ine-
ciency of tax competition since they increase the marginal cost of decentrally
raising public funds (cf. Wildasin, 1989). But, whereas the theoretical lit-
erature has already explored the conditions under which scal externalities
arise, empirical evidence on the magnitude of the distortions is still lacking
(e.g., Oates, 1999). Dierences in taxation of mobile factors are probably
most striking at the international level but their empirical analysis is facing
major obstacles. Given the complexity of national tax systems it is dicult
to work out the precise scal incentives provided by these systems. More-
over, the reporting of cross{border activities is often quite unsatisfactory.
Therefore, it seems important to augment the existing empirical evidence by
studying the eects of local taxation in federal countries. They often com-
bine the existence of highly open jurisdictions engaged in tax competition
with comparable institutions, tax codes, and data.
Several studies have already established signicant correlations between the
taxing decisions of neighboring local jurisdictions (e.g., Ladd, 1992, Brett /
Pinske, 1997, 2000, Brueckner / Saavedra, 2000, Buettner, 2001). In these
studies, the geographic proximity of jurisdictions is taken as an indicator
of their exposure to interjurisdictional competition. However, correlations
of taxing decisions might simply arise from mimicking neighbors's policies
in a yardstick competition (Besley / Case, 1995) without any eects on
the tax base. Therefore, these studies provide empirical evidence for the
existence of tax competition at the local level, but do not necessarily imply
the presence of distortions.
This paper takes a dierent route and focuses directly on the tax base eects
of local tax rates in a context of capital taxation. It employs a large panel
of local jurisdictions in a major German state which set the local tax rate
of the business tax. By testing whether both the local tax rate as well as
the tax rate of neighboring jurisdictions have a signicant impact on the
tax base, this approach explicitly delivers evidence on the existence of scal
externalities. Estimation is carried out with a exible generalized method
of moment (GMM) approach to dynamic panel data analysis suggested by
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Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988).
The results conrm the existence of horizontal scal externalities from local
taxation, as the tax rate of neighboring jurisdictions shows a signicant
positive eect on the local tax base whereas the own tax rate shows as
a signicant negative eect. In absolute value the two eects are about
the same size indicating that a joint increase of the tax rate at the local
jurisdiction and in its neighborhood has no eect on the interjurisdictional
distribution of the tax base. The rather large estimate for the eect of
the own tax rate on the tax base is shown to be consistent with a policy
of local jurisdictions, which is maximizing revenues net of scal transfers.
The emphasis on net revenues is important, since in the considered case
substantial transfers are related to the tax base due to revenue sharing
and, thereby, reduce the adverse tax base eects of tax increases for the
individual jurisdiction.
The next section derives the impact of the local tax rate on the tax base
in a stylized theoretical model with interregional factor mobility and factor
taxation. It yields a testable relationship between the local tax base, the tax
rates both of a local and a competing jurisdiction, and the grants received by
the jurisdictions. The empirical section investigates this relationship using
a panel of local jurisdictions. It starts with a description of the data and
specication issues. After presenting the results, the implications for the
local tax policy and the role of the revenue sharing system are discussed,
followed by the conclusions.
2 Theoretical view: scal impacts on the tax base
In order to derive a relationship between the local tax base and local tax
rates this section presents a simple model of tax competition where two
jurisdictions are restricted on their revenue side to use a tax on the mobile
factor. The analysis is kept simple by assuming that the local economy uses
only two factors: capital and labor. Capital is assumed to be mobile without
cost across jurisdictions, whereas the local supply of labor is assumed to be
xed. The local economy produces a single good according to the production
function,
y
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= g (e
i
) f (k
i
) ; g
0
 0; (1)
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where y
i
denotes output per worker and k
i
denotes the capital intensity at
location i. f is a linear homogenous production function in intensity form
and g is a neutral shift term capturing the non{negative productivity impact
of an all-purpose public good e
i
, also expressed in units per worker. Ac-
cordingly, public goods serve as a factor augmenting input (cf. Matsumoto,
1998). Taking account of possible productivity eects of local public ex-
penditures allows us to capture the role of public infrastructure for business
location. The revenue side of the local government's budget constraint con-
sists of tax revenues and grants
e
i
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i
b
i
+ z
i
; (2)
where z
i
denotes grants per worker, b
i
denotes the tax base per worker, and

i
is the tax rate. Assuming a static setting the budget is always balanced
and no decit or surplus can be run by the local government. The tax is
levied on local capital income, formally
b
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) k
i
: (3)
This specication of the local tax base deviates from the common set{up
in the literature which employs a tax on capital rather than on capital
income (cf., Wilson, 1999), but the latter is more close to the subject of the
empirical analysis. However, the empirical predictions of the model would
be quite similar with a tax on capital.
The mobility of capital introduces an additional constraint to the local
economy as it requires that the after tax rate of return is not dierent at
any opportunity location. If region j belongs to the set of opportunity
locations of region i this can be stated by the condition
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) f
0
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) ; (4)
requiring that the net marginal revenue of capital is equalized across loca-
tions. This condition plays a central role in the literature on tax compe-
tition, as it links the allocation of capital captured by k
i
; k
j
with the local
scal policies described by the tax rates 
i
; 
j
and the supply of public goods
e
i
; e
j
. Fiscal decisions aect the capital allocation in the following way. Con-
sider the special case where public goods have no impact on productivity,
i.e. g (e
i
) = 1. Then the increase of the tax rate at location i will reduce
the after tax rate of return at i, ceteris paribus. In order to reinstall interre-
gional equilibrium, equation (4) suggests that capital moves out of location
i until the marginal productivity of capital is high enough to compensate
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higher taxation. The partial impact of public goods can be illustrated best
in the opposite case, where public expenditures are productive and totally -
nanced out of grants and the tax rate is zero. Then an increase in the grants
received will cause an increase in the public good supply, and thereby an
increase in marginal revenue of capital, ceteris paribus. Condition (4) then
requires an inow of capital in region i until the marginal productivity is
reduced suciently in order to compensate higher overall productivity.
The scal decisions will generate scal externalities if the movement of cap-
ital out of or into location i aect the capital supply at location j. This
becomes most obvious if we consider a case of only two locations, where the
total supply of capital is xed. Then, k
j
is fully determined by k
i
according
to the full employment condition
k
i
l
i
+ k
j
l
j
= k; l
i
+ l
j
= 1; (5)
where k is the xed overall capital supply per worker and l
i
is the given
number of workers located at i. In this setting an increase of the tax rate at
location i will cause an outow of capital at location i and, simultaneously,
an inow of capital at location j. Similarly, an increase in grants to location
i will induce capital movements from j to i.
Formally, the impact of the scal parameters on the local stock of capital can
be obtained by total (logarithmical) dierentiation of equation (4), taking
into account that the local economy at both locations is described by the
system (2), (3), and (5). After some calculations the following expression is
obtained
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represents the elasticity of the marginal productivity of capital, and is
assumed to be greater than zero and less than unity
1 > '
i
> 0:
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i
is the elasticity of total productivity with respect to public expenditures
times the share of tax revenues in the local budget. Thus, it determines the
relative increase in local productivity resulting from an additional dollar
in tax revenues. It is assumed to be non{negative and, in order to make
sure that the bracket on the left hand side of equation (6) is positive, it is
required to be less than '
i
'
i
> 
i
 0:
By this condition the increasing returns introduced by the productivity im-
pact of public expenditures are always dominated by the decreasing returns
from holding constant the immobile factor. This is a standard assumption
in models with factor mobility and increasing returns as it ensures the deter-
minateness of the locational equilibrium (see Henderson, 1985, and Richter,
1994).
On the right hand side of equation (6) the two terms in squared brackets
associated with the relative change of the tax rates contain the tax rates.
Therefore, a prediction on the eects requires a statement about how the
tax rates are set. There are many reasonable alternatives to specify an
objective function for the local jurisdictions. But, as the focus is on the
eect of local scal decisions and not on their determinants a comprehensive
discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. However, if the tax rate 
i
is
set lower than 
i
, the benet from an increase in productivity due to a
higher supply of the productivity enhancing public good is larger than the
costs to the capital owners, and a higher tax rate is even in the interest of
the taxpayer. Therefore, it is reasonable to restrict the set of policy choices
by the requirement that

i
 
i
With this condition, the impact of the local tax rate on the level of capital
will be negative or zero, whereas the impact of the tax rate of the other
jurisdiction will be positive or zero.
The relative change of the local tax base can be derived by dierentiation
of the equation of the tax base (3) taking account of the budget constraint
(2) which results in
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The expression indicates that the tax base is increasing with the stock of
capital installed locally. If public expenditures exert an impact on produc-
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Table 1: Comparative static eects on the tax base
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tivity there are also direct positive eects of the tax rate and of the level of
grants received.
Expression (7) together with the equation for the change in the local stock
of capital (6) allows us to derive predictions on the comparative static ef-
fects on the local tax base. According to equation (7) in the absence of
productivity eects the tax base is driven only by the allocation of capital.
Then, one should observe a non{positive impact of the own tax rate (i) and
a non{negative impact of the other location's tax rate on the tax base (ii).
From equation (6) it can be seen that in a symmetric case with similar tax
rates and conditions in the two jurisdictions the size of the eects on the
equilibrium capital stock should be similar in absolute value. Then, a joint
increase in the tax rate would not aect the capital allocation and, hence,
the distribution of the tax base. This is, of course, reecting the assump-
tion of the model that capital owners can only choose among jurisdictions
and other supply eects are absent. In presence of a productivity impact
of public goods, however, a prediction of the impact of the own tax rate is
not possible without additional assumptions on the local policy objectives.
For instance, if the local jurisdiction would maximize revenues the impact
on the tax base would be negative, but if it were maximizing the supply of
capital a positive eect may be found. However, it should be noted that
regardless of the existence of productivity eects, if a negative impact on
the own tax rate is empirically observed, the model oers an unambigu-
ous explanation, namely that the equilibrium stock of capital is reduced.
Similarly, a positive eect of the competing jurisdiction's tax rate indicates
that the equilibrium capital stock is increased. If public goods do exert
productivity eects, grants to the location i will be positively related to the
tax base, but grants to the other location will show a negative impact. The
impact of grants to the other location is, however, not a standard scal ex-
ternality, as it is not directly determined by decisions of the other location's
6
government.
3 Empirical study of tax base eects
The aim of the empirical investigation is to provide evidence on the com-
parative static eects of tax rates and grants on the tax base as derived
above. It employs a panel of local municipalities or communities in a ma-
jor German state. Whereas the German system of scal federalism mainly
relies on a system of grants and tax revenue sharing and because it limits
taxing discretion at the local level, the current study focuses on the busi-
ness tax (Gewerbesteuer) which is the important exception to that system.
2
The code is dened uniformly across Germany, but the local tax rate of the
business tax is set by the communities. In case of rms with locations in
dierent communities uniform rules dene the allocation of the tax base to
the individual communities according to the payroll. Therefore, the busi-
ness tax might be a good empirical example of a local source based tax
on the earnings of a mobile factor. Leaving a more detailed description of
the institutional details to the appendix, the following section starts with a
short description of the main characteristics of the dataset.
3.1 Dataset
The dataset consists of the complete set of communities in a major German
state. It reports the revenues and tax rates from the business tax as well
as the level of grants and population on an annual basis from 1980 until
1996 for more than 1100 jurisdictions. In the period under investigation the
business tax precisely consisted of a combination of two taxes, one levied
on business earnings the other levied on business capital.
3
As the denition
of taxable business earnings not only includes prots but also a major part
of interest payments, the tax on business earnings can be regarded as a
capital income tax. Unfortunately the local revenues derived from the two
sources are not reported separately. Only at the national level information
is available, indicating that the tax on capital income determines about 90
% of the revenues from the business tax. Given the inability to distinguish
2
A short description of the business tax is provided in International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation
(1994: 146).
3
In 1997 the tax on business capital was abolished throughout Germany.
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empirically the two parts at the local level and given the dominance of the
earnings, the business tax as a whole is approximated in the following by a
tax on earnings (see appendix A for the details of the approximation).
The tax base is not actually observed but derived from the revenues after
dividing them by the tax rate. Since the reported revenues consist of tax
payments in advance net of tax rebates, the measured tax base is not strictly
related to the current period and rather uctuates around the true tax base
(see appendix C). As is reported in Table 2 the tax base shows marked
cross{sectional variation, ranging from more than 30,000 DM per capita to
gures below zero. The negative gures indicate cases where the tax rebates
exceed the payments in advance. But, note that this is only temporary, the
long term average of the measured tax base is positive for all jurisdictions.
In addition, the tax base shows a clear cyclical pattern, since the mean
declines with the recession in the 1981/1982, shows highest levels during
the unication boom in the early nineties, and declines afterwards in the
slowdown.
The tax rate on capital income is substantial, yielding a gure of 15.35 %
at the mean. It shows signicant cross sectional variation. For instance, in
1996 tax rates from 14.17 % to 20.37 % are reported. However, since the
business tax is deductible in personal and corporate income taxation, the
eective tax rate is lower. With 
NAT
denoting the rate of national income
taxation, the eective tax rate on capital income 
EFF
i
can be computed as

EFF
i
= 
LOC
i
 
1  
NAT

+ 
NAT
:
It depends on the national income tax rate 
NAT
which varies with the
characteristics of the tax payer.
4
The empirical investigation, however, does
not deal with the impact of the overall eective tax rate as such but focuses
on the role of interjurisdictional dierences. In order to measure tax induced
horizontal dierences the arbitrage condition (4) is evaluated at dierent
locations and the focus is on the ratio of net and gross returns determined
by:
1  
EFF
i
=
 
1  
NAT
  
1  
LOC
i

:
As the income tax rate 
NAT
is independent of the location of investment it
shows the same eect on the after tax rate of return across locations and the
4
For instance, the eective tax rate on retained earnings of a corporation in 1996 was increased by
the business tax by 8.2 percentage points on average, calculated using the corporation tax rate of 48.4 %
(including the unication levy (Solidaritaetszuschlag)). The 1996 gure for the private German tax payer
with the top rate is quite similar.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Tax Base per Capita Exog. Rev. per Capita Tax Rate
year mean min max mean min max mean min max
1980 2.816 -0.144 29.52 0.739 0.191 1.919 15.09 13.74 18.46
1981 2.555 -0.353 26.58 0.691 0.176 1.611 15.10 13.74 18.46
1982 2.301 -0.410 26.50 0.678 0.193 1.661 15.17 13.74 18.46
1983 2.180 -0.145 27.43 0.684 0.206 1.638 15.17 13.74 18.46
1984 2.237 -0.490 30.86 0.702 0.271 1.469 15.20 13.74 18.46
1985 2.274 -0.161 33.75 0.765 0.253 1.758 15.22 13.96 18.46
1986 2.570 -0.239 44.01 0.839 0.351 1.874 15.23 13.96 18.65
1987 2.742 -1.680 46.31 0.905 0.376 2.206 15.24 13.96 18.65
1988 2.806 -0.258 36.79 0.924 0.114 2.362 15.26 13.96 18.65
1989 2.988 -0.436 44.08 0.977 0.296 2.628 15.28 14.17 19.15
1990 3.072 -0.338 40.32 0.907 0.353 2.530 15.30 14.17 19.15
1991 3.032 -0.234 41.55 1.005 0.356 2.645 15.37 14.17 19.80
1992 3.075 -3.454 28.33 1.020 0.445 2.486 15.43 14.17 19.80
1993 2.877 -0.372 49.34 0.999 0.416 2.082 15.52 14.17 19.80
1994 2.790 -3.590 35.26 0.945 0.284 2.024 15.62 14.17 19.80
1995 2.521 -2.281 26.49 0.927 0.257 1.578 15.84 14.17 20.37
1996 2.683 -1.280 37.58 0.927 0.273 1.527 15.93 14.17 20.37
av.

2.678 0.022 27.73 0.861 0.328 1.898 15.35 14.17 18.94
Tax base and exogenous revenues in 1,000 DM per capita in prices of 1996. Own computations for 1110
communities in the state of Baden{Wuerttemberg.

statistics for long{term averages 1980-1996.
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rst term at the right-hand side drops out of the arbitrage condition. Thus,
what matters for location decisions within Germany is the wedge driven by
the local tax rate 
LOC
i
between returns after income tax and returns after
all taxes. In other words, the model suggests that the reduction of the net
rate of return relative to the reduction caused by the income tax aects the
location decisions.
5
Whereas the theoretical model has dealt with only two jurisdictions, the
empirical investigation requires the operationalization of the concept of op-
portunity or competing locations. For that purpose it seems helpful to
use the notion of neighborhood and to dene for each jurisdiction a set
of neighbors, whose scal decisions might aect the local jurisdiction. Al-
though neighborhood is a rather general concept, and need not necessarily
be dened in a geographical sense (cf. Case et al., 1993) the recent empiri-
cal literature on local tax competition as cited in the introduction suggests
that geographical proximity plays an important role. Following this line of
research, the empirical analyses uses a set of spatial weights in order to cal-
culate weighted averages of the scal parameters of the jurisdictions in the
local neighborhood. As usual in empirical studies with spatial eects the
concept used to dene the neighborhood is set a{priori and not determined
simultaneously with the estimation. However, a concept of neighborhood
is employed which has given the best results among a large set of alterna-
tives in a previous attempt to describe the local interdependence of taxing
decisions (see appendix C).
3.2 Estimation approach
The basic diculty in estimating the inuence of determinants of the busi-
ness tax base is to ascertain a possibly lagged response in the tax base in
the rather uctuating measure of the tax base available to this study. A full
representation of the underlying dynamics seems dicult given a dataset
with observations for only 17 years. However, the recent literature on panel
data estimation has developed procedures aimed at improving the quality of
the empirical representation of dynamic processes. In order to take account
of unobserved heterogeneity individual eects should be allowed for, which
{ in the current context { would pick up the given locational characteristics
5
If cost of mobility were taken into account the income tax rate would not drop out of the arbitrage
condition. In this case, the income tax rate constitutes a barrier to mobility as it is after tax earnings
which have to exceed mobility costs in order to trigger relocation. However, the relative attractiveness of
the locations would still be determined by the local tax rates.
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determining the attractiveness as a business location. They also pickup the
basic cross{sectional correlation between the jurisdictions (cf., Case, 1991).
Whereas the tax base of the business tax uctuates with the business cycle
the tax rates display a rather gradual trend. Therefore, it seems dicult
to assume constant slope parameters, a{priori, and, it may be that even
the variance of the cross{sectional distribution picked up by the individual
eects is not{constant over time.
Given these challenges to specication, it seems appropriate to follow the
suggestions by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) which build up an es-
timator relying on the quasi-dierencing procedure of Chamberlain (1983).
Within a dynamic panel data context this estimator allows to explicitly test
whether parameters including the variance of the individual eects are con-
stant over time. Accordingly, it is assumed that the true representation of
the tax base is
b
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where b
i;t
denotes the tax base per capita as observed at location i in pe-
riod t. 
i;t
and z
i;t
are the corresponding tax rate and grants per capita,
respectively. f
i
is the unobserved individual eect. Tax rates and revenues
denoted with a bar (
i;t
; z
i;t
) represent averages across the local neighbor-
hood using a spatial weighting scheme (see above). As tax rates are set
in advance and grants only react with a time lag to the current revenues
simultaneity might be less of problem (see appendix B for a discussion of
the determination of the grants). Nevertheless, all explanatory variables on
the right hand side are lagged, because the current tax obligation depends
on income in the previous year (see appendix C on the timing of the tax
obligation).
Note, that all coecients are indexed with the time period. Hence, (8) con-
stitutes a system of period specic equations. In order to remove individual
eects equation (8) is transformed into quasi-dierences, adjusted for the
change in the impact of the individual eect 	
t
, yielding the estimation
equation
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where the individual parameters are specic combinations of the underlying
structural coecients of equation (8) (for the details see Holtz-Eakin et al.,
1988: 1374f).
3.3 Specication issues
The available dataset provides 17 consecutive years of observation. Even
with immediate adjustment of the tax base two lags (m=2) should be al-
lowed for in equation (8) (see appendix C), since the tax base is calculated
from revenue data comprising payments in advance as well as tax rebates
(see appendix C). To take account of slow adjustment a model is estimated
with three lags (m=3) in the structural equation which requires the use of
four lags in the dierenced estimation procedure.
6
Even though the right
hand side variables can be considered as predetermined with respect to
the current tax base (and with respect to the following years' revenues)
the rst lag is no valid instrument in the quasi-dierencing procedure (cf.,
Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988), and estimation is only possible for 12 time peri-
ods. In specifying the set of instruments not all available instruments were
employed in order to keep the GMM{estimator's weighting matrix within
feasible dimensions. If available, each equation employs one lag more in its
specic set of instruments as is required for identication. That is, observa-
tions of the periods t-2,...t-m,t-(m+3) are used as instruments. The basic
estimation thus consists of estimating the 12 period specic equations with
55 overidentifying restrictions.
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As depicted in Table 3 the statistic of the test of overidentifying restrictions
(denoted with Q) does not suggest to reject the orthogonality of instruments
(cf. column 3). Using the basic specication the appropriateness of various
parameter restrictions is tested. Following the suggestions of Holtz-Eakin
et al. (1989) the rst restriction imposed is that the impact of the individual
eects is constant across periods (	
t
= 1; t = 1; :::; 12). As is displayed by
6
An alternative specication with ve lags (m=4) showed weak convergence indicating numerical prob-
lems with the enlarged weighting matrix of the GMM{estimator.
7
In order to get a reliable estimate of the weighting matrix given the computational restriction to the
lag{length rst{step estimation is carried out using 3SLS rather than 2SLS taking into account possible
error correlation between periods.
12
Table 3: Model selection
additional
condition dof Q [P-val.] restriction dof L [P-val.]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(I) 4 lags (m = 3) 55 53.4 [.536] (i) stationary
individ. eects 45 54.1 [.167]
(ii) 3 lags (m = 2) 60 102.9 [.002]
(II) 4 lags (m = 3) 100 103.1 [.396] (i) 3 lags (m = 2) 65 259.4 [.000]
and stationary (ii) no tax eects 78 123.0 [.000]
individ. eects (iii) no exp. eects 78 214.4 [.000]
(iv) all parameters
stationary,
(except a
0;t
) 175 2663 [.000]
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the L-Statistic in column (6) this restriction cannot be rejected.
8
However,
the reduction of the lag length to three periods (m=2) is rejected and,
thereby, slow adjustment in the true tax base is conrmed. The reduction of
the lag length was rejected also when testing conditional on the stationarity
of the individual eects. Two further statistics indicate that tax eects
and expenditure eects are signicant, separately. The usual parameter
restriction of equal slopes across equations is also rejected. Therefore, the
subsequent analysis employs a model with period specic coecients, four
lags (m=3), and stationary individual eects.
3.4 Estimation results
In order to obtain results on the sign and magnitude of the eect of each
variable the results can possibly be best summarized by listing the sum
of the coecients for each variable. For instance, accounting for the time
required for adjustment the neighbors' tax rate will have a positive impact
on the tax base in the long-run, if
3
X
l=1

2;l;t
> 0:
Given that the impact of the individual eect is stationary the sum of
structural coecients is determined by linear cross{equation combinations
of estimated parameters
3
X
l=1

2;l;t
=
3
X
l=1
d
2;l;t
+
2
X
l=1
d
2;l;t 1
+ d
2;l;t 2
> 0: (10)
and the sum of structural coecients can be inferred by summing the esti-
mated parameters across equations. The sum of structural parameters is,
however, identied only in 10 of the 12 estimation periods. Similar expres-
sions can be obtained for the other parameters.
9
Table 4 displays the results. It shows that the sum of the structural coef-
8
This chi-squared statistic tests for the dierence between the restricted and unrestricted sum of squared
residuals, cf. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), 1380f.
9
In the case of the coecients of the lagged tax base the sum of the structural coecients is
3
X
l=1

1;l;t
=
3
X
l=1
d
1;l;t
+
2
X
l=1
d
1;l;t 1
+ d
1;l;t 2
  3: (11)
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Table 4: Estimation results
dependent variable: tax base
tax rate exog. revenues tax base
neighb. own neighb. own
(t) (t) (z) (z) (b)
1987 2.38
??
-1.75
??
-5.98 4.04
??
-.295
??
(1.05) ( 0.66) ( 4.21) (1.28) (0.10)
1988 2.36
??
-1.74
??
-5.11 2.53
??
-.368
??
(1.03) ( 0.67) ( 3.91) (1.04) (0.08)
1989 2.41
??
-1.67
??
-4.08 1.38 -.410
??
(1.04) ( 0.68) ( 3.85) (0.99) (0.08)
1990 2.34
??
-1.73
??
-4.86 1.65
?
-.408
??
(1.05) ( 0.68) ( 3.55) (0.99) (0.07)
1991 2.48
??
-1.78
??
-5.90
?
2.03
?
-.360
??
(1.05) ( 0.69) ( 3.43) (1.05) (0.07)
1992 2.50
??
-1.71
??
-5.46 1.05 -.566
??
(1.06) ( 0.71) ( 3.46) (1.12) (0.07)
1993 2.21
??
-1.74
??
-6.74
??
0.79 -.730
??
(1.05) ( 0.74) ( 3.45) (1.19) (0.09)
1994 2.08
?
-1.75
??
-6.62
??
0.93 -.908
??
(1.06) ( 0.79) ( 3.37) (1.50) (0.09)
1995 1.94
?
-1.61
??
-6.04 1.91 -.994
??
(1.10) ( 0.82) ( 3.77) (2.12) (0.11)
1996 3.48
??
-1.79
?
-7.33
?
4.51
?
-.830
??
(1.41) ( 0.99) ( 4.29) (2.70) (0.13)
Sum of coecients from GMM estimation of the system of period specic equations (9) subject to the
restriction of four lags (m=3) and stationary individual eects. Standard errors in parentheses. The
coecients are marked with one or two stars, depending on whether the signicance level is 0.1 or 0.05
respectively.
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cients generally has the expected sign.
10
The neighbors' tax rates have a
positive impact, which is signicant in all years, indicating the presence of
scal neighborhood externalities. The own tax rate has a negative impact,
which is signicant in all years. This indicates that the average commu-
nity is not able to increase its revenues proportionally with the tax rate,
and, thus, is facing a \revenue hill" (cf. Inman, 1995, and Haughwout et
al., 2000) with a slope of less than unity. The coecient of the local tax
rate is somewhat smaller in absolute value than that of the coecient of
the neighbors' tax rates. The above theoretical derivation of the eects has
shown that this is consistent with an impact of public expenditures on the
local productivity. But, formal testing using Wald-statistics shows that one
can only reject the equality in absolute value for the period 1996. Hence, it
can be stated that a joint increase of the tax rate at the local jurisdiction
and in the neighborhood has no signicant eect on the local tax base.
For the grants the results give a similar picture although the signicance
is much weaker. An increase in the own revenues tends to have a posi-
tive eect, whereas the increase in the neighbors' revenues tends to have
a negative inuence. This supports the hypothesis that the budget has in
fact some positive impact on local productivity. But, again, it was tested
whether the coecients are equal in absolute value and based on a Wald
statistic this could not be rejected. This indicates that if there are produc-
tivity eects of local public expenditures they are much weaker than the
eects of the tax rates.
The last column in Table 4 shows the sum of the coecients for the lagged
tax rates following equation 11. The signicant negative coecients seem to
indicate that there is not a gradual adjustment process of the tax base but
rather an overshooting reaction. However, the negative correlation across
time in the tax base can be attributed to the fact that the underlying tax
revenues do not reect the current tax obligation. As is shown in appendix
C, an overshooting response of the employed measure of the tax base to
an innovation in the tax base can be expected from the way the tax is
administered.
10
The fact that the sum of coecients shows only small changes across years it not a contradiction to
the result from specication testing that parameters are dierent across periods. Rather, it indicates that
the time pattern of the adjustment varies whereas the total eect stays roughly similar.
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3.5 Quantitative interpretation
Taking into account the coecient for the lagged tax base the average point
estimate of the long-run eect of an increase in the tax rate is
db
i
d
i
=
 1:726
1 + 0:587
=  1:088 (12)
indicating that the tax base is reduced by DM 1,088 per capita
11
if the
tax rate is increased by one percentage point, ceteris paribus. In order to
get an impression about the magnitude of this estimate the relative impact
is calculated at mean values of the tax rate and the tax base using the
statistics of Table 2. This gives an average elasticity of the tax base with
respect to an increase in the own tax rate of about
12
d log b
i
d log 
i
=  5:86 (13)
This is a rather strong eect, since a policy of revenue maximization would
imply an elasticity of (minus) unity. As the elasticity shows a higher ab-
solute value this seems to indicate that the tax revenues would rise if the tax
rate is reduced, i.e. the average jurisdiction seems to be at the downward
sloping part of its revenue hill.
However, this apparent deviation from a revenue oriented policy can be
explained by a closer look at the state's scal institutions. First, there is
vertical revenue sharing with the county, the state, and the federal level.
Second, there is also substantial horizontal revenue sharing or \scal equal-
ization", which strongly redistributes revenues between the state's commu-
nities. Probably, since taking away a part of the tax revenues brings about
particularly strong disincentives on the taxing eort of the local jurisdic-
tions, the scal transfers are not directly determined by the actual tax rev-
enues but by the taxing capacity of jurisdictions dened by some measure
of the tax base. As a consequence, given the tax base a change in revenues
due to a change in the local tax rate is fully reected in the local budget.
But, a change in revenues due to a change in the tax base at a given tax
rate is only to a limited extent aecting the local budget, since a major part
is shifted vertically to the upper scal tiers and horizontally to other local
communities. Therefore, if an increase of the local tax rate reduces the tax
11
The estimation employs tax base and grants in terms of 1,000 DM per capita.
12
Evaluated using the mean of the tax base and the tax rate in the periods 1987-1996 and 1986-1995
respectively.
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base, the local jurisdiction exerts negative scal externalities onto others by
reducing transfers paid and increasing the grants received. A similar type
of negative scal externality is known from the discussion about vertical tax
competition (e.g., Wrede, 1997, and Keen, 1998).
As shown in appendix B, the revenue sharing institutions imply to replace
the grants variable in the above budget equation (2) by
z
i
= z
i
  
RS
b
i
; (14)
where the rst term on the right hand side denotes grants received irre-
spective of the local tax base. The second term captures the role of the
local tax base in determining the net volume of grants received. 
RS
can
be regarded as an implicit tax of the revenue sharing system (RS). Dier-
entiating the modied revenue equation with respect to the tax rate the
following condition is obtained for maximizing the revenues net of transfers
d log b
i
d log 
i
!
=  

1 

RS

i

 1
: (15)
Accordingly, if the implicit tax of the system approaches zero (
RS
= 0),
revenue maximization implies an elasticity of the tax base of unity (in ab-
solute value). But if there is signicant revenue sharing, maximization of
revenues net of transfers goes along with an elasticity of the tax base above
unity (in absolute value). If the implicit tax rate would approach the ac-
tual tax rate, all eects on the tax base would be shifted onto others and
net revenue maximization would be achieved even with an innite absolute
value of the tax base elasticity.
Although the complexity of the revenue sharing system makes it dicult to
come up with an general gure, a detailed inspection of its main rules reveals
that for a representative jurisdiction the level of the implicit tax rate is in
fact at least 80 % of the its tax rate (see appendix B). Similar calculations by
the local governments association obtain a gure of 85 % (cf. Kopp, 1994).
Therefore, a net{revenue maximizing tax policy of local jurisdictions would
be consistent with a tax base elasticity above 5 (in absolute terms). Since
the estimated elasticity is not signicantly dierent from that value, we can
state that, taking into account the revenue sharing system, the average local
jurisdiction is at the top of its net{revenue hill.
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4 Summary and conclusions
This paper has presented a test of a central tenet in the recent literature
on tax competition, namely, that local jurisdictions taxing a mobile factor
cause signicant externalities on other jurisdictions. Since recent empirical
ndings point to a signicant interdependence of tax rates among geographic
neighbors the analysis has focused on neighborhood externalities. Using a
large panel of local jurisdictions the results conrm the existence of scal
externalities. An increase of the own tax rate signicantly lowers the local
tax base whereas an increase in the neighbors' tax rates raises the local tax
base. The two eects are approximately of the same size in absolute value
indicating that a joint increase of the tax rate at the local jurisdiction and
in its neighborhood has no eect on the interjurisdictional distribution of
the tax base. However, it should be noted that the empirical analysis has
removed state wide eects and focused on the change of the distribution of
the tax base within the state. Therefore, the results are not suggesting that
a joint tax increase in the whole state would not have adverse eects on
the tax base. Nevertheless, the symmetry of the tax eects points to rather
weak productivity eects of public expenditures which is also conrmed by
the weak signicance of grants.
The estimated tax base eects of the tax rates are quite strong, indicating
an apparently paradoxical situation where a reduction of the local tax rate
would lead to an increase of the local tax revenues. However, this can be at-
tributed to the existence of substantial intergovernmental transfers related
to revenue sharing: a reduction in the tax base goes along with a reduc-
tion in transfer obligations due to vertical revenue sharing as well as with
an increase in scal "equalization grants" received. A detailed inspection
of the revenue sharing rules has revealed that net of transfers the average
community is at the top of its revenue hill. Hence, although the empirical
analysis supports the existence of scal externalities in local tax competi-
tion the local jurisdictions do not experience an impact on their perceived
marginal cost of raising public funds. In that respect, the revenue sharing
institutions serve as a device to internalize scal externalities. However,
a thorough welfare assessment would have to take into account that local
revenue sharing reduces the incentive for local jurisdictions to raise their
tax base as they can rely on intergovernmental grants. In addition, the
literature on vertical tax competition suggests that in the considered case
additional disincentives arise from the vertical dimension of the revenue
sharing system.
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A The German business tax
In the period under investigation German business taxation is a combina-
tion of taxes on earnings and capital. The local communities determine the
actual tax rates by choosing a multiple or collection rate (Hebesatz) which
is applied to basic tax rates of 5 % on earnings and 0.2 % on capital (cf. In-
ternational Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 1994: 146). Accordingly, the
revenues are described by a function
R
i
= c
i
[0:05 (E
i
  R
i
) + 0:002K
i
] ; (16)
where the tax base is determined by the business earnings E
i
  R
i
(after
deduction of the tax payments), the amount of business capital K
i
, and
the multiple c
i
. As the denition of taxable business earnings not only
includes prots but also a major part of interest payments, the tax on
business earnings can be regarded as a capital income tax. The basic tax
rates and the denition of taxable earnings and taxable capital in the tax
code determine the weights of business earnings in the combined tax base.
According to the Business Tax Statistics, in 1995 the weight of earnings is
much higher than that of capital as 89.8 % of tax payments belong to the
tax on business earnings (cf. German Statistical Yearbook, 1999: 529). As
revenues in 1995 where particular low because of the weak performance of
the German economy, the weight of business earnings might even be higher
in other periods. However, the local revenues derived from the two sources
are not reported separately. We, therefore, simplify the analysis and treat
the whole business tax as a tax on capital income. For that purpose the
local tax rate is approximated by
R
i
 
LOC
i
E
i
; where 
LOC
i
=
c
i
0:056
1 + c
i
0:05
: (17)
The approximation uses the fact that the average ratio of the taxable base
of capital and earnings tax before deduction of taxes is 2.976 (cf. German
Statistical Yearbook, ibid.). Replacing business capital in equation (16)
and isolating earnings gives the expression. In order to check whether the
results are sensitive to variations in the approximation of the local tax
rate, estimations have also been carried out without an adjustment for the
business capital. The results were almost identical.
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B The implicit tax of the revenue sharing system
In the considered case, the local jurisdictions have discretion in setting the
tax rate but they do not have full autonomy in using the tax revenues col-
lected due to revenue sharing at large scale.
13
It should be noted, however,
that the transfers related to this system are not directly determined by the
actual tax revenues but by the taxing capacity of jurisdictions dened by
some measure of the tax base. Therefore, additional revenues due to an
increase in the tax rate at the given tax base are fully received by the ju-
risdiction. But, additional revenues due to an increase in the tax base are
not. In order to assess the actual net revenue eect of taxing decisions, this
appendix shows how the institutional rules can be feed explicitly into the
above model. For that purpose, the budget constraint (2) is augmented by
transfer obligations tr
i
and \scal equalization" grants z
FE
i
.
e
i
= 
i
b
i
+ z
0
i
  tr
i
+ z
FE
i
; (18)
where z
0
i
denotes grants not related with the revenue sharing. For a typical
jurisdiction, there are basically three dierent transfer obligations: oblig-
ations due to vertical revenue sharing (tr
V R
i
), contributions to the county
budget (tr
CC
i
), and contributions to the scal equalization system (tr
FE
i
).
tr
i
= tr
V R
i
+ tr
CC
i
+ tr
FE
i
; where: (19)
tr
V R
i
= 
V R
b
i
(vertical revenue sharing); (20)
tr
CC
i
= 
CC
 

FE
  
V R

b
i
+ z
FE
i

(county contribution); (21)
tr
FE
i
= 
FE
 

FE
  
V R

b
i
+ z
FE
i

(equalization contribution):(22)
The transfer obligation due to vertical revenue sharing is simply dened by
a standard tax rate on the tax base 
V R
(cf. equation 20). The transfer
obligations to the county and into the scal equalization system are deter-
mined as fractions 
CC
; 
FE
of standardized revenues which include (part
of) the equalization grants (cf. equations 21 and 22). The equalization
grants are dened as a fraction (70 %) of the dierence between scal needs
n
i
and standardized revenues, where the needs are determined mainly by
characteristics of the local population.
z
FE
i
= 0:7

n
i
 
 

FE
  
V R

b
i

: (23)
13
There are only very few descriptions of Germany's local government nance available in English. The
interested might refer to Norton (1994, 237.). A standard reference in German is Junkernheinrich (1991).
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Inserting into equation (18) yields the following denition of the revenues
after transfers
e
i
= z
i
+ 
i
b
i
  
RS
b
i
; (24)
z
i
= z
0
i
+ 0:7n
i
 
1  
FE
  
CC

; (25)

RS
= 
V R
+
 

FE
  
V R
  

FE
+ 
CC
+ 0:7
 
1  
FE
  
CC

:(26)
Table 5 gives an overview of the parameters determining 
RS
in the time
period of the investigation. Following the common praxis in the German
literature it reports the multiples instead of the transformed local tax rate
in order to facilitate direct comparisons. However, the key parameter in the
above analysis, the ratio of the total implicit tax rate of the revenue sharing
system to the tax rate 
RS
=
i
is invariant to the transformation of the tax
rate and thus is equal to the ratio of the corresponding multiples c
RS
=c
i
.
The rst two columns report contribution rates in percentage to the state's
scal equalization system (column 1) and the average contribution rate to
the local county (column 2). Columns (3) to (5) display key parameters
for the denition of local taxing capacity. Columns (3) and (4) report
standard multiples for the equalization system and vertical revenue sharing,
respectively. The percentage rate in column (5) determines the share of
equalization grants which are taken into account in the calculation of the
county contributions. The last three columns display the consequences of
the system. It turns out that on average the ratio between the implicit
multiple of the revenue sharing system c
RS
to the median tax rate is about
80 %. However, as pointed out by Kopp (1994) there are additional tax
base dependent features of the revenue sharing system like the investment
grants (Investitionspauschale) which are not taken into account. In addition
approximately a third of all jurisdictions receives additional grants in order
to reach a guaranteed minimum budget per capita despite their low taxing
capacity. This suggests that the average contribution will be even higher.
C Sources and denitions of data
Communities: The dataset consists of the 1111 communities (Gemein-
den) of the state of Baden{Wuerttemberg. In the German system of
scal federalism the communities build the lowest of the scal tiers.
The 1111 communities form 44 districts, i.e 35 counties (Kreise) and 9
independent cities (Kreisfreie Staedte). The community of Blaubeuren
22
Table 5: Parameters of revenue sharing system
Jahr 
FE

CC
c
FE
c
V R
 m(c
i
) c
RS
c
RS
m(c
i
)


RS
m(
i
)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1980 16.00 19.18 300 80 100 310 257.22 0.83
1981 17.00 19.18 300 80 100 310 257.88 0.83
1982 17.00 19.18 290 80 100 310 249.79 0.81
1983 17.00 19.18 290 58 100 310 245.58 0.79
1984 17.00 19.18 290 52 100 310 244.43 0.79
1985 17.91 19.18 290 52 100 310 245.08 0.79
1986 17.75 19.30 290 52 75 315 252.45 0.80
1987 17.75 19.39 290 52 75 315 252.51 0.80
1988 17.75 19.59 290 52 75 315 252.65 0.80
1989 20.10 19.71 290 52 75 315 255.40 0.81
1990 20.25 19.83 290 52 75 320 255.65 0.80
1991 19.60 19.81 290 54 100 320 247.10 0.77
1992 19.60 19.60 290 57 100 320 247.50 0.77
1993 20.00 22.45 290 39 100 320 246.66 0.77
1994 20.00 24.44 290 56 100 320 251.00 0.78
1995 20.00 25.77 290 79 100 330 255.67 0.77
1996 20.00 . 290 78 100 330 . .
av. 0.80
Source: columns (1), (3), (4), and (5) are taken from Trump (2000). Column (2) reports the average
county contribution taken from various publications of the association of communities (Gemeindetag), the
value of 1996 was not available at the time this paper was nished. Column (6) reports the statewide
median of the multiple. Columns (7) and (8) own calculations, see text.
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(id: 425020) is removed from the dataset as it reports a very high
negative tax revenue in 1996 (-25.6 Million DM) resulting from repay-
ments to a large local employer. Whereas an excess of repayments
is also observed at other observations the size of this case is rather
exceptional.
Tax base: The tax base is calculated from the total revenues of the Busi-
ness Tax (Gewerbesteueraufkommen, brutto) as reported in the an-
nual budgetary statistics (Jahresrechnungsstatistik) provided by the
state's statistical oce (Statistisches Landesamt Baden{Wuerttemberg).
It is obtained by dividing tax revenues by the tax rate as dened in
equation (17). The obtained measure of the tax base is employed in
terms of 1,000 DM per capita in constant prices of 1996.
As the tax payments are not strictly related to the tax base in a certain
period the measure of the tax base uctuates strongly around the true
tax base. To see this, consider the following approximation, where the
tax revenues in year t are made up by payments in advance as well as
repayments for the previous period.
R
i;t
= 
i;t
b
i;t 1
  
i;t 1
[b
i;t 2
  b
i;t 1
] :
The rst term on the right hand side depicts the current payments in
advance according to the tax base in the previous period, the second
term displays net repayments. Dividing by the tax rate one obtains a
measure of the tax base
~
b
i;t 1
= b
i;t 1
 

i;t 1

i;t
[b
i;t 2
  b
i;t 1
] :
Taking dierences across time yields
d
~
b
i;t
= db
i;t

1 +

i;t

i;t+1

  db
i;t 1


i;t 1

i;t

:
It follows that a shock in the tax base db
i;t
has a more than pro-
portional eect on the measured tax base d
~
b
i;t
. In fact, the reported
change is twice as large as the true innovation if the tax rate is un-
changed. The reason is that an increase in the tax base leads to
a reduction of repayments as well as to an increase in advance pay-
ments. In the following period, then, it has negative eect by reducing
the repayments. As a consequence, one should expect an overshoot-
ing reaction and negative autocorrelation in the calculated tax base
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data. However, the eect might be less strong as jurisdictions have
some possibility to adjust the payments in advance in certain circum-
stances, but the quantitative signicance cannot be ascertained from
the published data.
Local multiples of the local business tax (Gewerbesteuer) for the years
(Rechnungsjahre) 1980{1996 are obtained from the state's statistical
oce.
Grants refers to the sum of \scal equalization" grants (Schluesselzuweisungen)
and the community's share of income tax revenues (Gemeindeanteil
an der Einkommensteuer) reported in the annual budgetary statistics.
Matching grants are not included. Employed in terms of 1,000 DM
per capita in constant prices of 1996, source: SDRB. Note that in-
come tax revenues are shared with the federal and the state level with
common tax rates, nationally.
Price index used is the national producers price index (Erzeugerpreisin-
dex) forWest Germany (source: Council of Economic Experts, \Sachver-
staendigenrat").
Annual population refers to the rst of January, census data, ocial
projections using resident registration information, obtained from the
state's statistical oce.
Spatial weighting matrix: Euclidian distances are computed from a
digital map of the geographical position of the administrative center
of each community. The employed matrix denes local neighbors as
communities located within a distance of 30 kilometers (km). Each
neighboring jurisdiction is weighted according to the inverse of its rel-
ative distance. In an attempt to estimate the reaction function of local
jurisdictions by means of spatial maximum likelihood techniques (cf.,
Anselin, 1988), the chosen weighting matrix has shown the best t
(likelihood) in a grid search procedure among several alternatives in-
cluding larger ranges and dierent weights (cf. Buettner, 2000). The
complete matrix has a dimension of 1111, shows an average weight
of .0236, contains 47028 nonzero links and an average of 42.3 links.
The two most connected communities show 83 links, the least con-
nected community display 5 links. From the complete matrix the row
referring to the skipped observation (see above) is removed.
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